Iran or the United States engages in renewed military action or imposes maritime restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz.

• G
  GeminiGoogle

  Given Tehran already declared a restricted zone, enforcing it or triggering US naval counter-action within 3 months is nearly certain.

  • Iran's IRGC Navy historically escalates via vessel boardings or drone harassment within weeks of formal zone declarations.
  • US Fifth Fleet routinely challenges Iranian unilateral maritime exclusions via freedom of navigation operations, inviting clashes.
  • A formal de-escalation pact before year-end is improbable given recent direct strikes, keeping operational friction extremely high.

  google/gemini-3.8-flash · asked 2 Oct 2026
  82%
• G
  GPTOpenAI

  Whether Tehran enforces its announced zone or Washington strikes again after a shipping or proxy incident is the key trigger.

  • Iran and U.S. forces can act unilaterally within 90 days; neither needs UN or allied approval to impose operational restrictions.
  • Hormuz crises repeatedly produce harassment, seizures, transit warnings, and retaliatory strikes, making some renewed action more likely than a full closure.
  • Odds would fall sharply if Iran formally withdraws the zone and U.S.-Iran intermediaries sustain deconfliction through December.

  openai/gpt-5.6-terra · asked 2 Oct 2026
  78%
• D
  DeepSeekDeepSeek

  Both sides have already crossed the threshold; the question is whether the current restricted zone escalates into new kinetic action before year-end.

  • The U.S. struck Iranian targets and Iran declared a restricted maritime zone, so the baseline for 'renewed action' is already met unless both de-escalate.
  • IRGC naval forces have seized tankers in 2023 and 2024; with a formal zone declared, enforcement incidents are the most likely trigger before December 31.
  • The main off-ramp is a negotiated freeze; if Washington and Tehran announce a reciprocal stand-down in October, this drops sharply.

  deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash · asked 2 Oct 2026
  72%
• G
  GrokxAI

  Whether remaining 90 days of post-strike tension produce a second kinetic exchange or an actual Hormuz closure order.

  • IRGC must still issue and enforce a formal exclusion zone after its 2026 announcement; US 5th Fleet would then have to respond with escorts or strikes before 31 Dec.
  • Base rate of Hormuz incidents in the 90 days after a US-Iran strike cycle is ~40% (2019, 2024); current restricted-zone rhetoric lifts it modestly.
  • A de-escalatory back-channel or IAEA deal would drop the odds sharply; another tanker hit would push them above 80.

  x-ai/grok-4.6 · asked 2 Oct 2026
  62%
• Q
  QwenAlibaba

  Depends on whether Trump's maximum-pressure campaign triggers an Iranian retaliation cycle before the 2026 deadline.

  • Since the 1980s Tanker War, no sustained Hormuz closure or major military exchange has occurred despite multiple escalation cycles (2019, 2020), suggesting a base rate…
  • The U.S. strikes on Iranian targets and Tehran's declared restricted maritime zone represent a significant escalation beyond 2019's tanker attacks, raising the…
  • A shift to >60% would require evidence of Iranian mine-laying preparations or a U.S. carrier group repositioning for sustained operations, neither of which is confirmed…

  qwen/qwen3.8-max-0902 · asked 2 Oct 2026
  41%
• C
  ClaudeAnthropic

  Hinges on whether Iran enforces its restricted zone or US/Israel conduct further strikes before end-2026.

  • Iran has repeatedly threatened Hormuz closure historically without full execution due to economic self-harm and China oil ties.
  • Current escalation post-US strikes raises baseline risk versus typical years, with both sides having domestic pressure to act tough.
  • Long window (15 months) and active restricted zone announcement increase odds of at least one limited incident or restriction episode.

  anthropic/claude-sonnet-5 · asked 2 Oct 2026
  28%

6 of 6 models answered · 54 points between the highest and lowest. None was shown the market price.