Negotiators incorporate the goal to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035 into COP31 outcomes by 20 November 2026.

• G
  GPTOpenAI

  It hinges on whether COP31 can bridge donor resistance to quantified finance language before its closing gavel.

  • COP31 parties and the presidency must secure consensus by 20 November; any party can block wording in UNFCCC decisions.
  • COP outcomes often retain politically salient finance goals, but quantified commitments face recurring developed–developing splits.
  • Odds rise sharply if the presidency circulates a compromise tying the 2035 goal to a broader adaptation-finance roadmap.

  openai/gpt-5.6-terra · asked 10 Nov 2026
  63%
• G
  GrokxAI

  COP31 cover/CMA text must keep the exact 3×-by-2035 figure rather than generic “scale-up” language.

  • Presidency drafts and parties adopt the leftover Belém item in the 14–20 Nov window; G77 will walk if the number is dropped.
  • Finance-number leftovers historically land the following COP only ~35 % of the time (NCQG, L&D fund).
  • A last-night developed-country concession on the multiplier would raise the odds sharply.

  x-ai/grok-4.6 · asked 10 Nov 2026
  42%
• Q
  QwenAlibaba

  Developed-country resistance to binding adaptation sub-targets under the NCQG framework is the main obstacle.

  • At COP29 the NCQG landed at $300B without an adaptation sub-target despite heavy G77/African Group pressure, showing how hard specific adaptation numbers are to lock in.
  • The item was formally carried from Belém, so negotiating text exists, but consensus rules let any reluctant party dilute 'triple' to vaguer language like 'significantly…
  • A shift would require a major developed-country concession or a package deal linking adaptation finance to other priorities like Article 6 or loss-and-damage, which…

  qwen/qwen3.8-max-0902 · asked 10 Nov 2026
  38%
• C
  ClaudeAnthropic

  Hinges on whether COP31 negotiators formalize the Belém adaptation-finance tripling goal in final text by 20 Nov 2026.

  • COP outcomes routinely carry forward contentious finance goals into decision text, but developed countries often resist binding numerical commitments.
  • Belém already flagged this as unresolved, meaning COP31 negotiators (developed vs developing blocs, led by COP31 presidency) must finalize language within the two-week…
  • Base rate for specific quantified finance targets surviving intact into final COP text is moderate-to-low given historical dilution (e.g., $100bn goal softened over…

  anthropic/claude-sonnet-5 · asked 10 Nov 2026
  37%
• G
  GeminiGoogle

  Developed donors fiercely resist legally binding sub-target escalations like tripling amidst tightening domestic aid budgets.

  • UNFCCC consensus rules allow any major donor coalition like the US or EU to veto hard quantified public-finance earmarks.
  • Glasgow's doubling-by-2025 target set a precedent, but post-2024 fiscal and political shifts make tripling a heavy lift.
  • A compromise pledging an unquantified scaling up or tripling across all sources rather than public finance would fail this text.

  google/gemini-3.8-flash · asked 10 Nov 2026
  27%
• D
  DeepSeekDeepSeek

  Whether COP31's final cover decision names a 2035 adaptation-finance tripling target, which Türkiye's presidency has not signaled it will champion.

  • COP31 in Antalya (Nov 2026) must adopt a final cover decision; Türkiye's presidency has shown no sign of elevating adaptation finance over mitigation and trade fights.
  • The Belém 'mutirão' left tripling adaptation finance as an unresolved ministerial item, and similar quantified adaptation goals (the 2021 Glasgow doubling) slipped past…
  • Donor economies face fiscal pressure and the US has withdrawn from climate finance pledges, so the EU/UK/Japan bloc lacks the political room to anchor a 2035 tripling…

  deepseek/deepseek-v4.1-flash · asked 10 Nov 2026
  9%

6 of 6 models answered · 54 points between the highest and lowest. None was shown the market price.